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WITNESS IMMUNITY IN MODERN TRIALS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE
UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RONALD L. CARLSON*
The constitutional battle over the proper scope of
witness immunity has been stilled, momentarily
quieted by the Supreme Court's decision in Kastigar
v. United States.' The current struggle on the
question has largely moved from the courts to the
legislative arena, where lively controversy marks
debates over pending legislation. Congress has a
major overhaul of the federal criminal laws under
consideration, including a comprehensive immunity
provision.' Several states with existing immunity
laws are reconsidering their provisions. In jurisdic-
tions without such statutes, a good deal of enacting
legislation has been introduced.'
At a time of widespread interest in immunity law
revision, the attention of rule drafters appropriately
may be directed to model statutes in the field. A new
provision has been promulgated by the prestigious
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.4 In one
Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, the Commis-
sioners incorporate a suggested immunity law. The
impact on legislative thinking no doubt will be
substantial.
What form should any new immunity law take?
Kastigar articulates only minimum standards. It
merely resolves the question of what can be, not the
harder question of what should be. Is "use" immu-
nity more effectively administered than competing
* Professor of Law. Washington University, St. Louis,
Mo.; J.D., Northwestern University (Clarion DeWitt
Hardy Scholar); LL.M., Georgetown University (E. Bar-
rett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy). The author
acknowledges the research assistance of James Dean of
Washington University School of Law, and expresses
appreciation for several source materials supplied by the
Journal staff.
1406 U.S. 441 (1972) (use immunity, as opposed to full
transactional immunity, approved). The author does not
imply that Kastigar has resolved all the constitutional issues
in the field, and certain unanswered points will be devel-
oped later in this article. Kastigar does address itself to
certain major questions, however, including especially the
constitutionality of "use and fruits" immunity laws.
IS.1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3111 (1974).
'See, e.g., H.B. 788, Mo. 78th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess.
(1975).
'UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b)
(1974).
patterns which embrace transactional immunity?
Which approach best assists law enforcement, and
which makes for fairer, more efficient justice? Such
inquiries pose vital criminal law issues today. They
will be considered in this article, with some discus-
sion taking place in the context of the Uniform Rule
on witness immunity. That rule provides an excellent
vehicle for reviewing the proper scope of witness
immunity, a most controversial topic, and it raises
many other contemporary issues in the immunity
field.
THE UNIFORM RULE AND HISTORICAL MILEPOSTS
Rule 732(b) of the Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a witness who is ordered to
answer a question over a valid claim of privilege
"may not be prosecuted or subjected to criminal
penalty . for or on account of any transaction or
matter concerning which, in compliance with the
order, he gave answer or produced information."' By
51d. The Uniform Law Commissioners created a Spe-
cial Committee on Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The chairman of this special committee pointed out that
the rules were prepared by the committee, its reporters
and staff director. The proposed legislation was approved
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August,
1974, and is recommended for adoption by the states. The
rule provides:
Rule 732. [Immunity.]
(a) Compelling production of information despite
assertion of privilege. In any proceeding under these
Rules, if a witness refuses to answer or produce
information on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, the [district] court, unless it finds
that to do so would not further the administration of
justice, shall compel him to answer or produce
information if:
(1) The prosecuting attorney makes a
written request to the [district] court to order
the witness to answer or produce informa-
tion, notwithstanding his claim of privilege;
and
(2) The [district] court informs the wit-
ness that by so doing he will receive immu-
nity under subdivision (b).
(b) Nature and scope of immunity. If, but for this
Rule, the witness would have been privileged to
withhold the answer or information given, and he
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thus embracing the concept of transactional immu-
nity, the Uniform Rule follows a long-standing
American approach in this field.
The privilege against self-incrimination has deep
roots in English and American history, ' and immu-
nity laws represent an attempt to balance society's
need for testimony with an individual's right to
silence.' American statutes dating to the mid-
nineteenth century provided for broad transactional
immunity. 8 When Congress tried to narrow the
scope in one enactment, the Supreme Court found
the provision unconstitutional.' This 1892 decision
by the Court indicated that an immunity statute, in
order to pass constitutional muster, must provide
absolute immunity against future prosecution re-
garding the offense to which the question relates. 15
complies with an order under subdivision (a) compel-
ling him to answer or produce information, he may
not be prosecuted or subjected to criminal penalty in
the courts of this State for or on account of any
transaction or matter concerning which, in compli-
ance with the order, he gave answer or produced
information.
(c) Exception for perjury and contempt. A witness
granted immunity under this Rule may nevertheless
be subjected to criminal penalty for any perjury, false
swearing, or contempt committed in answering, fail-
ing to answer, or failing to produce information in
compliance with the order.
6 Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19
VILL. L. REv. 470, 471 (1974).
'United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1342 (2d
Cir. 1974).
'The Compulsory Testimony Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch.
19, §§ 1-3, 11 Stat. 155, provided for full and complete
immunity from prosecution in connection with any fact or
act communicated by the witness in compelled testimony.
The protection was so wide that it sometimes resulted in
"immunity baths," a witness immunizing himself by
volunteering incriminating information in a formal pro-
ceeding. See Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in
Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tight-
rope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1579 (1963) ("Most immunity
acts grant immunity broadly .... ). On the history of
immunity grants, see Note, Judicial Enforcement of Non-
statutory "Immunity Grants": Abrogation by Analogy, 25
HAST. L.J. 435, 443-50 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
HASTINGS].
"Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (in-
validating statute which limited the scope of immunity by
providing that compelled testimony could not be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding; the coerced witness
remained subject to future prosecution if there was other
evidence against him, but the Court found such "use"
immunity to be too narrow). For an historical analysis of
prior federal immunity legislation see Dixon, The Fifth
Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 447, 554 (1954).
1 0Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 586, discussed
in Comment, supra note 6, at 474.
Congress quickly responded to the idea advanced
in the Court's opinion. Consistent with the judicial
observation that immunity should be transactional,
Congress passed the Compulsory Testimony Act of
1893.1" This Act returned immunity to the pattern
encouraged by the Court. The Compulsory
Testimony Act dealt with proceedings under the
Interstate Commerce Act, and protected witnesses
from the threat of criminal prosecution in connection
with matters arising out of their required testimony.
Providing immunity for any transaction "concerning
which he may testify," the Act became a prototype
for numerous federal immunity statutes enacted by
Congress up until the 1970 Crime Control Act. 12 It
influenced state enactments as well. 13
THE REAPPEARANCE OF USE IMMUNITY
Transactional immunity had become the regular
pattern for immunity in federal legislation. In 1964,
however, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission. 14 Apparently prompted by
certain language contained in that opinion, Congress
reintroduced, after a lapse of some eighty years, "
"use" immunity into federal legislation in the 1970
Crime Control Act. Section 6002 of the Crime
"Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
"UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b),
Comment A (1974).
"For state patterns see note 65 infra.
11378 U.S. 52 (1964). Murphy held that where a
defendant is compelled to answer questions about a crime in
one jurisdiction, a second jurisdiction may not use his
answers or the "fruits" of same to prosecute him. However,
the second jurisdiction might prosecute if other evidence of
the crime was available there. However, the Murphy Court
did not address itself to the scope of prosecution in the
immunizing jurisdiction, this being the question treated in
the 1970 Crime Control Act at the federal level. Comment,
supra note 6, at 475. See HASTINGS, supra note 8, at 461
(effect of Murphy was to create an exclusionary rule based
on the fifth amendment which operates as a complete bar to
use of the compelled testimony by any jurisdiction).
What if different immunity standards apply? Suppose
the compelling state granted transactional immunity, while
the federal government follows the "use/derivative use"
pattern. May the federal government prosecute or is it
bound to honor the complete bar imposed by the state? See
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964);
People v. Gentile, 47 App. Div. 2d 930, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 69
(1975) (although New York grants full transactional
immunity, it need not insure federal transactional immunity
to a witness).
Murphy ordained no prosecution by federal authorities
on evidence gathered under a state grant of immunity. The
other side of the coin was mentioned in United States v.
Watkins, 505 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1974), which observed
that states are similarly bound when an immunized witness
has testified in a federal proceeding.
"See note 12 supra.
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Control Act provided that no testimony compelled
under a court order, including information derived
therefrom, could be used against a witness in a
criminal case.6 However, the witness could be
prosecuted for the crime he was required to talk
about on the basis of other, independent evidence.
In view of its own prior opinions on witness
immunity as well as conflicting lower federal court
decisions on the constitutionality of section 6002,17
the Supreme Court reviewed that section in Kastigar
v. United States. 18 Kastigar involved witnesses who
had been granted immunity and were ordered to
answer questions by the United States District
Court. They refused. The court held them in
contempt. The witnesses claimed that the immunity
they had been granted under section 6002 was not
coextensive with their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the important question whether testimony
may be compelled by granting immunity from
the use of compelled testimony and evidence de-
rived therefrom ("use and derivative use" immu-
nity), or whether it is necessary to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which compelled
testimony relates ("transactional" immunity). 19
In resolving this question, the Court touched
upon the critical need for witness immunity laws:
1618 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). It has been argued that the
term immunity may not be technically applicable in federal
practice today, especially after the repeal of the Act ofJune
19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 216
(repealed by 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (1970), repeal
effective four years after the effective date of the later act,
i.e., Dec. 14, 1974). Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective
Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal
Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational
Accommodation?" 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. __, 2 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Thornburgh]. However that may be,
when referring to the protection offered a witness under 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) the term immunity has obtained to
popular usage as well as employment generally in legal and
judicial circles. See Bauer, Reflections on the Role of
Statutory Immunity in the Criminal Justice System, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & C_.., 3 n.24, 4, 5, 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Bauer]. In addition, the term appears in the caption to
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). Thus, it will be used in this arti-
cle, as it has been by other writers in this symposium. See,
e.g., Thornburgh, supra, at 5.
17 Compare Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 (9th
Cir. 1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 915 (1972), with In re Kor-
man, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952
(1972). In another action Leslie Bacon attacked her de-
tention, claiming she was improperly taken into custody
as a material witness. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d
933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing this author as to the ma-
terial witness point).
18406 U.S. 441 (1972).
19Id. at 443.
The existence of these [immunity] statutes reflects the
importance of testimony, and the fact that many
offenses are of such a character that the only persons
capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context
of such offenses, and their primary use has been to in-
vestigate such offenses. Congress included immunity
statutes in many of the regulatory measures adopted
in the first half of this century. Indeed, prior to the
enactment of the statute under consideration in this
case, there were in force over 50 federal immunity
statutes. In addition, every State in the Union, as well
as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one
or more such statutes. The commentators, and this
Court on several occasions, have characterized im-
munity statutes as essential to the effective enforce-
ment of various criminal statutes. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter observed, speaking for the Court in Ull-
mann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), such
statutes have "become part of our constitutional
fabric." Id., at 438. 20
The Court then turned to the question of whether
a constitutionally sound immunity statute must
embrace the complete immunity standard recognized
in the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Counselman
v. Hitchcock. 21 The Kastigar Court decided that the
absolute immunity language of Counselman was
unnecessary to the Court's decision in that case, was
not binding authority, and that "use/derivative use"
immunity could be incorporated in federal laws.
Section 6002 was constitutionally unassailable. In
approving that section, however, the Supreme Court
warned that heavy burdens must rest upon prosecu-
tors seeking to prosecute witnesses who have been
compelled to testify. In such later prosecutions for
crimes related to the witness' testimony, there must
be a showing that the government's evidence is
untainted by the preceding compelled testimony. The
Court's view in this regard has created intriguing
developments in subsequent litigation. The govern-
ment carries a distinct burden: it may proceed only
on independent evidence. The view of the Court is
stated:
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropri-
ate, is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it
imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived
from a legitimate source wholly independen of the
compelled testimony.
... One raising a claim under this statute need only
show that he testified under a grant of immunity in
order to shift to'the government the heavy burden of
"Id. at 446-47 (footnotes omitted).
"See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
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proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
derived from legitimate independent sources. 22
ADMINISTERING THE KASTIGAR STANDARD:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It has been suggested that a prosecutor who
gathers evidence under a grant of immunity will find
little difference between use and transactional
immunity.2" There is substantial difficulty imposed
on the prosecutor in demonstrating that the govern-
ment's case springs entirely from evidence derived
independently of the immunized testimony. Illustra-
tive is the case of United States v. Strachan. 
2 4 There,
the U.S. Attorney sought to prosecute an individual
to whom use immunity had been granted. The
government ultimately dismissed the prosecution.
The Strachan case was one of the few where a pros-
ecutor tried to prosecute someone in these circum-
stances. Apparently the difficulty of making the
requisite showing of non-utilization of immunized
testimony impedes most potential prosecutions."
22406 U.S. at 460-62. On the measure of proof necessary
to negate "taint" see Comment, supra note 6, at 486, which
argues for the applicability of a heavier standard than mere
preponderance of the evidence.
For Supreme Court cases after Kastigar in which an
immunity question was involved see United States v.
Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973). The Wilson decision is discussed in Recent
Developments, 13 Ari. CR5t. L. REV. 271 (1975). In note 3
of the Wilson decision the Supreme Court refers to the
scope-of-immunity problem without relitigating that issue.
Wilson, originally convicted of bank robbery on a guilty
plea, had not preserved the issue for review. United States
v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231, 1233 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 309 (1975). In the United States
Court of Appeals Wilson had urged that the scope of
immunity provided under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) was
constitutionally insufficient because "use" immunity under
the statute did not prevent the employment of Wilson's trial
testimony (given at an accomplice's trial) when Wilson
came up for his own sentencing on the bank robbery
conviction. McCormick suggests that the privilege may run
through sentencing and until the time for direct appeal has
expired. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 121, at 256-57 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
2
F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL, G.
STARKMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (Supp. 1975) [cited
hereinafter as INBAU[. The authors of this text include
prosecutors and law professors.2
1Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C. 1975). The Strachan case
had an interesting history. Prior to the dismissal, Judge
Sirica inquired into the question of "uses made by the
prosecutors of the immunized disclosures of Mr. Strachan."
United States v. Mitchell, 384 F. Supp. 562, 563 (D.D.C.
1974). The Strachan dismissal order i4 noted in United
States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d 818, 825 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
25 INBAU, supra note 23. On the difficulties of prosecu-
tion see Thornburgh, supra note 16, at 18. Under one
Other procedural problems have arisen in connec-
tion with the "use/derivative use" standard. One
issue which has vexed trial courts recently is the
question of when to hold a "taint" hearing. In
United States v. De Diego
2 6 a witness had testified
under grants of immunity in Florida and California
concerning his part in the conspiracy to enter the
office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. LewisJ.
Fielding. The immunized testimony had come into
the hands of federal authorities who later attempted
to try him under a federal conspiracy indictment. De
Diego moved to dismiss the federal indictment. He
urged that the U. S. Attorney had not met the bur-
den of establishing that the government's case was
free of the taint of De Diego's prior testimony given
under state immunity grants. After considering the
motion, United States District Judge Gerhard
Gesell dismissed the indictment.
The government appealed. On review, the court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that "[o]nce im-
munity is shown, the prosecutor has the burden of
demonstrating that its use of the immunized testi-
mony has not tainted any aspect of the case up to
indictment and will not do so during trial."
2 7
However, the order dismissing the indictment was
reversed because of the trial court's failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the question of taint. The
reviewing court ruled that where a prosecutor claims
independent evidence of a witness/defendant's in-
volvement in a crime, the trial court should not dis-
miss the government's case without giving the
prosecutor a hearing to prove lack of taint.28 A
strong rule was announced. The trial court has "no
discretion" to order a summary dismissal.
The appellate court described the choices before a
trial judge as follows:
A trial court faced with a pretrial motion to dismiss
the indictment because of immunity granted by Fed-
eral or State Governments has basically four alterna-
tive procedures for determining whether or not the
proposal, prosecutors would be required to go through a
certification procedure before a witness testifies, and in any
subsequent prosecution of such a witness the government
would be restricted to using only previously certified
evidence. Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases
After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as YALE L.J.], discussed in Thornburgh,
supra note 16, at 19. On the minimal number of prosecu-
tions following testimony coerced by "use" immunity see
Bauer, supra note 16, at 15 n.86.
20511 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 821.
2 8Id. at 822.
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prosecution's evidence is tainted: (I) it can hold a pre-
trial evidentiary hearing; (2) it can hold a taint hear-
ing during the trial as the questioned evidence is
offered; (3) it can hold a post-trial hearing to deter-
mine taint; or (4) it can use a combination of these al-
ternatives.
2 9
The hearing procedures suggested by the De
Diego court appear to be well conceived. Apparently,
however, other circuits have employed more sum-
mary alternatives in which the hearing deemed so
necessary by De Diego was not required when the
request for such relief is made by the accused. (In
De Diego the government asked for the hearing.)
The decision in United States v. Thanasouras
30
demonstrates the sometimes confusing course of the
law. A witness testified before a special grand jury.
Later he was indicted for a conspiracy around which
several grand jury questions had centered. The de-
fendant requested an evidentiary hearing, with the
burden resting on the government to show the in-
dictment was not tainted by the prior grant of "use"
immunity. The trial court analyzed the questions
which the government had put to the witness at the
grand jury proceeding, found that the questions re-
vealed a good deal of information obtained independ-
ent of the defendant's answers, and concluded that
it was "clear from the government's questions that
it had obtained considerable information about the
defendant's alleged illegal activities from Frank
Bychowski, an unindicted co-conspirator, prior to
the defendant's immunized testimony." ' 3 1 An evi-
dentiary hearing was deemed unnecessary, and the
defendant's motion was denied. The court stated:
Thus, the particular facts of the instant case do not
necessitate an evidentiary hearing at this time as to
whether the instant indictment was the product of an
independent evidence source which is exclusive of
any information or leads obtained from the defend-
ant's immunized testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. McDaniel, 352 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.D. 1972).
Under the peculiar circumstances and facts attend-
ant to the instant indictment, the requested eviden-
tiary hearing is not required in the interests ofjustice.
To grant an evidentiary hearing in this case would
only serve to allow the defendant "pre-trial discov-
ery" which has already been denied by this Court.
3 2
29
1Id. at 823-24. For a collection of cases in which federal
prosecutions have been attacked on the ground they were
tainted by state-granted immunity see id. at 822 n.4.
"'368 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
311d. at 537.31Id. On discovery in connection with immunity pro-
Interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court may well be in order to clarify the "when" and
"whether" aspects of hearing procedures. Outside of
the most exceptional cases, it would appear prudent
to follow the lead of De Diego and to conduct an
evidentiary hearing whenever the taint question
appears. Protective orders could be adopted to
safeguard from disclosure to the defendant any
information which might threaten the safety of
others. 3
WORTH THE EFFORT?
In grappling with the questions of hearing rights,
applicable burdens of proof, and conflicting judicial
interpretations, one question continues to recur: Are
the attendant rules and procedures necessitated by
"use" immunity worth the effort? In his dissent in
De Diego, Judge McGowan concluded:
The rule of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1972), creates certain
problems where, as here, two states and the federal
government grant one conspirator immunity in order
to force testimony against the other conspirators, that
testimony is then either passed around or made public,
and finally there is an attempt to try the immunized
person jointly with the other conspirators. It is true
that such a trial is not impossible, but where, as here,
the prosecutor advises the court against severance and
presses upon it only the alternative of what would
surely have been a prolonged taint hearing claiming
the energies of all the parties to the impending trial
just before it was to get underway, I believe that the
district judge has an inherent power to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice; and I would affirm its
exercise in this instance. 31
ceedings, see United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). The Braasch
case involved payoffs to Chicago police by tavern owners.
The members of the police department who were involved
claimed they had a right to be present at hearings granting
immunity to several dozen bar owners. The court held they
had no right to be present nor any right to obtain the iden-
tity of government witnesses by being furnished copies of or-
ders granting immunity. 505 F.2d at 146. On other aspects
of the Braasch case see Wolfson, Immunity-How it
Works in Real Life, 66 J. CrIM. L. & C. __, 16-18,
20-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wolfson].
"3 See similar ideas contained in other criminal proce-
dure rules, such as the new sentencing procedures incorpo-
rated in 1975 amendments to FED. R. CRIt. P. 32(c) (3).
1' 511 F.2d at 832. See the two-day hearing procedure
described in United States v. Mitchell, 384 F. Supp. 562
(D.D.C. 1974).
Respecting the debate over "use" versus transactional
immunity, one writer has suggested that "use" immunity
may make a witness' testimony more credible, or perhaps
seem so. See Thornburgh, supra note 16, at 5. A significant
19761
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Occasionally, a defendant will be successfully
prosecuted after having given immunized testimony.
But even the majority of the court of appeals in De
Diego, while reversing the case in favor of the
government, suggested certain problems. The court's
opinion noted that the same prosecutor's office
involved in De Diego had recently undertaken to
dismiss United States v'. Strachan, a case "apparently
similar in some respect to the one before us." '3 - The
court expressed hope that the prosecutor would
review the charge against De Diego "in the light of
his action in Strachan, if such a review is
indicated." 3 6
If only a miniscule number of defendants may be
successfully prosecuted after a grant of "use" immu-
nity, is a change in the federal immunity pattern
indicated? Put differently, is an ornate procedural
and hearing network justified when "prosecutors say
that there is little difference between use immunity
and transactional immunity? 3 7" One important
question remains: If there is a certain similarity in
the practical operation of both approaches, do any
important considerations militate in favor of trans-
actional immunity?
The drafters of the new Uniform Rule on witness
immunity thought so, since they concluded that
considerations of effective law enforcement dictated
transactional immunity. The drafting committee
question remains: Isn't there a strong motivation for the
witness to "shade" trial evidence in favor of the government
in order to please a prosecutor who continues to hold the
hammer of prosecution over his head? Indeed, isn't it
human for a suspect/witness to "go overboard" in trying to
help authorities who can still prosecute him under a "use"
immunity scheme? As for the suggestion that such a witness
might be prosecuted for perjury, a prosecutor's motivation
to vigorously do so would seem diminished when the
witness' greatest error was in advancing the government's
case too zealously.
It has been urged that a disadvantage of transactional
immunity is that a witness can shield himself from
subsequent prosecution simply by mentioning pertinent
past criminal acts in the course of giving immunized
testimony. Thornburgh, supra, at 21. However, one major
safeguard against witness abuse involves the principle of
"responsiveness." If the witness' answer is not responsive to
the question, which may be narrowly framed, immunity
may properly be denied. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). See
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b), Com-
ment D (1974). While this restriction on a witness' ability
to abuse witness immunity may be circumvented, it appears
to provide the government with a viable mechanism for
limiting the problem. See YALE L.J., supra note 25, at 180.
11511 F.2d. at 825.
3 6
/d.
"See INBAU, supra note 23, and text accompanying note
23 supra.
discussed the views of a committee member who had
special expertise in the immunity area. This member
maintained that some prosecutors prefer transac-
tional immunity because the witness who is only
granted "use" immunity is likely to tell less than one
testifying under a transactional grant.3" A related
point had been made earlier when the 1970 Crime
Control Act was debated. The then-Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation opposed
"use" immunity. Concerned that section 6002 of the
pending 1970 Crime Control Act might be con-
strued as replacing the transactional immunity pro-
vision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the
Chairman forecast that such a result would "make
it more difficult for the Corporation to obtain in-
formation from individuals that relates to the risks
being assumed by the Corporation in insuring
bank deposits." 3 9
3 8
UNIFORi RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732, Com-
ment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Some other arguments
made in the Uniform Rule discussion on behalf of transac-
tional immunity include: (1) under a use immunity scheme,
even though the compelled testimony is not used in
evidence, knowledge of it better equips the prosecutor to
probe the defendant's direct testimony; (2) if evidence is
located by means of the coerced testimony, there is a general
reluctance of courts to vigorously enforce the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine; (3) analogizing immunized testi-
mony to coerced confessions, and thereby excluding the
witness' statements as well as the "fruits of the poisonous
tree," provides inadequate protection when dealing with
evidence secured under immunity grants. In connection
with this last point the Supreme Court in Kastigar had cited
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), a confes-
sion case, to support its view that excluding the witness'
testimony from further use as well as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" provided proper protection. The Comment
to the Uniform Rule termed the analogy to confessions
unsound. To dismiss a prosecution completely because a
single policeman conducted, perhaps in haste, an unconsti-
tutional interrogation would be a high price to pay for the
constable's blunder. On the other hand, the rule drafters
urge that the prosecutor granting immunity makes a calm
and calculated judgment as to whether to grant it. In such
circumstances, a ban on prosecution (where the immunity is
transactional) occurs not as a result of blunder or happen-
stance but rather as the product of reasoned choice.
'IS. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 132-34 (1969).
See Note, Immunity from Prosecution and the Fifth
Amendment: An Analysis of Constitutional Standards, 25
VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1228 n.97 (1972).
In other cases, witnesses may occasionally face conse-
quences more fearsome than jail. See Judge Bauer's
discussion of witnesses who are threatened with death if
they talk. Bauer, supra note 16, at 11. A witness may be
understandably frightened by the prospect of talking, then
being prosecuted and sent to the jail which houses the
culprit he was forced to testify against. Again, if sent to
another institution, friends of the initial defendant might be
imprisoned in the witness' place of incarceration.
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As a former consultant in the field of legislative
drafting, the author of this Journal article has
encountered certain reactions similar to those dis-
closed in the preceding paragraph. While police and
prosecutor opinions vary, there are some who main-
tain that complete immunity may be necessary in
important cases to persuade a member of a criminal
gang that the government is "playing fair." A
critically needed witness will sometimes suffer con-
tempt punishment rather than speak, unless he is
assured that he will not be prosecuted after he talks.
Of course, prosecutors frequently make informal
arrangements of this kind by simply promising not to
prosecute a witness who cooperates. But occasionally
the witness wants something more. The desire for
this "something more" might be a compelling moti-
vation where the prosecutor is up for re-election. The
prosecutor's vulnerability at the polls is a point of
keen concern to the potential witness. If the "some-
thing more" desired by the witness can be given
through transactional immunity, does the desirability
of having it available suggest a need for it on the
statute books? Some authorities think it does.4" One
commentator concluded the point this way:
The impact of Kastigar is still uncertain, but it has
been suggested that an anomalous result might be
expected. Quite possibly, section 6002, designed to
achieve effective law enforcement against organized
crime, may lead to precisely the opposite result. A
witness may find no incentive to talk where he can still
be prosecuted and may prefer the consequences of a
contempt finding. Testimony in such a situation may
lead to animosity on the part of compatriots and an
accompanying fear on the part of the witness of adverse
non-legal consequences. Without the added incentive
inherent in the removal of all criminal sanctions,
silence may indeed be golden. 4
4 See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra. There is, of
course, an additional possibility. Some authorities may
suggest that what has been said in the above text should cut
in the direction of making two immunity sections available
to the same prosecutor. Under such a pattern, the prosecu-
tor could choose to invoke the "use" or "transactional"
sections of an immunity law as the occasion demands. At
least one state statute blends both use and transactional
immunity language. IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.9 (Supp.
1975-76) (one portion of statute authorizes "immunity to
prosecution"; another section provides that evidence given
by a witness granted immunity shall not be used against
him in any proceeding). One potential interpretation of
such a statute is that an immunized witness cannot be
prosecuted criminally, but can be pursued in a subsequent
civil suit wherein he is protected only by use immunity.
" Comment, supra note 6 at 495, citing Note, Immunity
and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 Ast. J. CRIM. L. 29
(1973); Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under
the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 LOYOLA
L.A.L. REV. 350 (1973); 48 WASH. L. REV. 711 (1973).
SELECTED TRIAL PROBLEMS
Practical trial questions occur in connection with
the government's presentation of its case through
witnesses who have been granted immunity. Because
a witness has been immunized, is his testimony
particularly vulnerable to a credibility attack? Is the
grant of immunity a target for special attention in
defense summation? Should the fact of immunity be
singled out in the court's instructions?
The recent decision in United States v.
Demopoulos2 gives qualified approval to special
mention of immunity in the court's instructions to the
jury. In his jury charge, the trial judge warned the
jury that the testimony of an immunized witness
"must be examined and weighed by the jury with
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary
witness." 4 3 The defendant asked the trial judge to
instruct the jury that the testimony of an immunized
witness "should be received with suspicion," and
further requested that immunized government wit-
nesses Boznos and Crispino be characterized as
"informers" in the court's instructions. The trial
court denied the first request as repetitive, a ruling
42506 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
991 (1975).
3 1d. at 1179. For related pattern jury instructions
see 2 F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, COMPLETE MAN-
UAL OF CRIMINAL FORMS, Form 60:9, at 482 (2d ed.
1974); 1 E. DEVTT & C. BLACKIAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §12.02, at 255 (2d ed. 1970).
In the Demopoulos case, the court further instructed the
jury "that in weighing the testimony of each witness it
should consider his relationship to the Government or the
defendant and any interest that he had in the outcome
of the case." The jury charge also described the scope and
extent of immunity granted witnesses Boznos and Cri-
spino under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). 506 F.2d at 1179.
See People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 459, 31 N.E.2d 898,
901 (1940) (accomplice required promise of immunity for
his testimony; court refers to this as one of the reasons why
the statement was open to "gravest suspicion"; in such
cases it is necessary, to warrant conviction of defendant, to
have corroborative evidence independent of accomplice's
testimony).
While some courts may give only the general credibility
instruction when an immunized witness testifies, in others a
special jury charge may be employed. In 1 E. DEVITT & C.
BLACKNMAR, supra, § 12.02, at 255 an illustrative instruc-
tion appears:
The testimony of an informer who provides
evidence against a defendant for pay, or for
immunity from punishment, or for personal ad-
vantage or vindication, must be examined and
weighed by the jury with greater care than the
testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must
determine whether the informer's testimony has
been affected by interest, or by prejudice against
defendant.
RONALD L. CARLSON
approved by the United States Court of Appeals. As
to the "informer" request the reviewing court stated:
Boznos and Crispino were not informers, for they
testified only when ordered to do so under grants of
use immunity. In closing this matter, we cannot fault
the trial judge for the inclusion of the following sent-
ence in the immunity instruction:
However, the fact that this government witness
was granted immunity also is not a justification
under the law for your finding a defendant not
guilty if you find that his guilt has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt from your considera-
tion of the evidence. 44
Regarding the issue of final arguments, some
latitude must be given defense counsel. It has been
held that the defense is free to urge that an
immunized accomplice who testified against his
client may be selfishly seeking to protect himself (or
another), as the inferences from the evidence in a
particular case may suggest. 41 Of course, counsel is
restricted to drawing inferences from the record and
may not "testify" during closing argument. The
appropriate limits of a jury argument in a criminal
case have been considered in various trial standards,
and the subject has been the object of comment in
numerous appellate opinions.4 6
Further, during the evidence-taking phase of the
case the witness who testifies for the government is
open to impeachment on matters demonstrating
"bias, prejudice, interest, or the willingness of the
witness to be unscrupulous in giving testimony."
4
1
Inasmuch as a witness' prior contacts with the
government and the grant of immunity may affect his
testimony, such subjects are generally treated as open
for exposure on cross-examination. 4
44506 F.2d at 1180.
"United States v. DeLoach, 504 F.2d 185, 187, 190
(D.C. Cir. 1974). For a suggested form of final argument by
defense attorneys see Wolfson, supra note 32, at 39-41.
"See Carlson, Argument to the jury and the Constitu-
tional Right of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (1973)
(collecting cases and citing ABA standards).47 Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeach-
ment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 239, 253 (1967). See
M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 203, 213 (1972). See also People v. Brunner, 32
Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973) (promise of
immunity does not make accomplice's testimony inadmissi-
ble, but where immunity agreement depends on conviction
of person against whom testimony is sought, possibility of
false evidence is too great and prosecutors may not bargain
for such a result).
48On the latitude allowed a cross-examiner to question
and impeach in a criminal case see Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974) (attack on a witness' credibility may be
While recognizing the right of defendants to attack
the credibility of immunized witnesses, at the same
time it should be noted that the immunized witness
operates under constraints designed to insure the
reliability of his testimony. The witness is himself
subject to later prosecution for perjury. In an effort to
insure accurate trial testimony from immunized
witnesses, the Uniform Rule incorporates a long
accepted approach in immunity legislation by provid-
ing: "A witness granted immunity under this Rule
may nevertheless be subjected to criminal penalty for
any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed
in answering, failing to answer, or failing to produce
information in compliance with the order."
49
Suppose the witness who is testifying at trial is not
a former associate (turned state's evidence) of the
defendant, but is instead the defendant himself.
Special impeachment problems are raised when
the defendant is confronted with a prior trial tran-
script. The situation comes up this way: If the de-
fendant had previously testified in a related pro-
ceeding under a grant of "use" immunity by ap-
pearing as a government witness against a co-con-
spirator, he may himself be charged with a similar
offense. Under the "use" immunity statutes the
transcript of his prior testimony is not usable as
an admission against the defendant in the govern-
ment's case-in-chief. But if the accused takes the
stand in his own defense, is the prior transcript
usable for another purpose, namely to impeach his
later testimony? Some commentators have suggested
that statements compelled under an immunity grant
made by revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives of the witness). The preceding text and footnote
references deal with the law applicable to cross-examina-
tion. Tactics and techniques of examination are reviewed in
Wolfson, supra note 32, at 23, 26-38.
4' Rule 732(c), supra note 5. The provision was taken
from the older MODEL STATE WITNESS IMMUNITY ACT
(1952). On using the record of testimony given under an
immunity grant to prosecute for perjury, as well as a
description of the penalties for giving false testimony, see
Taylor v. United States, 509 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1975)
(compelled testimony before grand jury cannot be used
against witness unless he commits perjury before grand jury
or otherwise fails to comply with immunity order); United
States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (immunized grand jury testimony
usable in perjury prosecution); In re Baldinger, 356 F.
Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Application of United States
Senate Select Committee, 361 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C.
1973); United States v. Doe, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973); Note, Statutory
Immunity and the Perjury Exception, 10 CAL. W.L. REV.
428 (1974); Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 972-73 (1968).
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may be employed to impeach the defendant when
those statements are in direct conflict with his
in-court testimony. 5 However, other cases, such as
United States v. Hockenberry, 5 support the op-
posite conclusion.
Hockenberry negates the claimed right of the
government to impeach an accused who is on trial for
one crime (crime A) by using immunized testimony
taken from him in connection with a separate crime
(crime B). The court held that such compelled
admissions of wrongdoing obtained under a grant of
immunity could not be used later to discredit the
witness' effort to defend himself against a charge of
some other wrongdoing. 52 The court found the rule
of Harris v. New York 3 to be inapplicable. Harris
allowed impeachment of a defendant by prior incon-
sistent statements taken in violation of the Miranda
rule. Distinguishing Harris as a delineation of the
limits of protection afforded by the Miranda proce-
dural requirements, Hockenberry refused to allow
impeachment from the transcript of immunized
testimony.
Arguably unresolved by Hockenberry was the
question of whether a witness initially questioned
about crime A under a grant of "use" immunity
can be charged and confronted with his own
statements upon a subsequent trial for crime A.
If it does not answer that question, Hockenberry
certainly militates against such a result. Another
authority which by analogy suggests an inability to
use immunized testimony for impeachment purposes
is new rule 11 (e) (6) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, entitled "Inadmissibility of Pleas,
Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements." The rule,
which became effective August 1, 1975, insulates
from use for collateral impeachment purposes those
statements made by an accused while offering a
guilty plea. Rule 11 (e) (6) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea
of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or
of statements made in connection with, and relevant to,
any of theforegoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in
"5See, e.g., Comment, supra note 6, at 485, citing
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See also
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1223 (1971); Com-
ment, Impeachment, Use Immunity and the Perjurious
Defendant, 77 DICK. L. REV. 23, 46 (1972).
51474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973).
52Id. at 250. See Comment, supra note 6, at 484.
53401 U.S. 222 (1971).
any civil or criminal proceeding against the person
who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a
statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a
plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is
admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false
statement if the statement was made by the defendant
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel. 51
One situation contemplated under the foregoing
rule involves statements made by a defendant who is
attempting to plead guilty. In such a case, the
defendant must demonstrate a factual basis for the
guilty plea. However, the judge may rule that the
offered plea is not understandingly made, refuse to
accept it, and set the case for trial. The factual state-
ments made by the accused during the unsuccessful
attempt to plead guilty may later conflict with the ac-
count of the crime which he gives during the trial.
Just as rule 11 (e) (6) makes these plea-related state-
ments inadmissible, so also it may be urged that
immunized testimony should not be allowed for im-
peachment. At the very least, federal rule 11(e) (6)
demonstrates that Harris v. New York 5 will not be
relentlessly applied in all situations to allow im-
peachment by prior contradictory statements. Cou-
pling the principle recognized in rule 11(e) (6) with
the Kastigar language that use immunity prohibits
prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect,"5 one might reasonably
conclude that prior immunized testimony is not
available to impeach a criminal defendant.
A final trial problem concerns the witness who
initially refuses to testify because of potential self-
incrimination, and then, when immunized, continues
54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) (emphasis added).
551d. On the effect of rule 11 (e)(6) and the bar imposed
against using plea-related statements to impeach, see M.
LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON Evi-
DENCE (Supp. 1976); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 410-6, 410 [011 (1975).
56406 U.S. at 453. In addition, Harris v. New York
allows use of an arrested person's voluntary incriminating
statements to impeach. In contrast, frequently missing from
immunized testimony is any aspect of voluntariness.
In connection with the suggested conclusion that immu-
nized testimony is unavailable for impeachment, a further
question must be raised. May the prosecutor make non-
evidentiary use of such testimony, either in forming subse-
quent charges against the witness or in planning cross-
examination at trial? While United States v. McDaniel,
449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992
(1972), indicates a negative answer, it was a pre-Kastigar
case, and some commentators view it as being undercut
by Kastigar. See Comment, supra note 6, at 479-80.
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to resist because of the risk of foreign prosecution.
This problem might come up under either transac-
tional immunity statutes or use immunity schemes.
Even with a national grant of immunity, the threat of
foreign prosecution may be very real in certain cases.
If the fifth amendment protects a witness from
incriminating himself under foreign laws, an immu-
nized witness might still refuse to testify, pointing to
the incapacity of any immunizing authority to
protect him completely. Of course, the problem will
not arise in the ordinary felony. But some conduct
may transgress both domestic and foreign laws, and
thus raise the issue of foreign prosecution.
This question has been largely sidestepped by the
courts. Raised in 1974 by an American citizen who
was deported from Mexico, the United States Court
of Appeals did not review the full sweep of the fifth
amendment. " The citizen had been cited for con-
tempt for failing to answer questions before an
American grand jury. The questions concerned his
transportation of marijuana to the United States
from Mexico. He had been granted immunity in the
United States, but claimed the immunity was insuffi-
cient to protect him from prosecution in Mexico. The
appellate court's response was that grand jury
proceedings are secret, and "we cannot assume that
the rule will be broken and the proceedings disclosed
to the Mexican government." 8 Thus, he had no
right to refuse to cooperate.
In other opinions, courts have artfully avoided a
determination of the issue by finding no substantial
danger of foreign incrimination in the compelled
testimony. " There will be future cases, however, in
which the testimony poses a real threat of foreign
prosecution, thus eliminating the "no substantial
danger" ground for resolving the case. This might
occur in a situation where a witness' actual testimony
at trial is needed so the case cannot be simply
resolved on the secrecy ground. When such hard
cases arise, intensive scrutiny will have to be given
the scope of the fifth amendment. Under one view,
"when the threat of incrimination arises under
"In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1038 (1974).
511d. at 881.
19 Comment, supra note 6, at 490, citing Zicarelli v. New
Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972),
and In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972). In a very
recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit ruled that the defendant had failed to
particularize "any real or substantial danger of foreign
prosecution." In re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222, 223 (1st Cir.
1975).
foreign law, it seems that the privilege would be well
served by holding it applicable in that context." '0
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on significant trial prob-
lems connected with the administration of witness
immunity. This focus appears to be deserved in view
of the complexity and importance of the pretrial and
trial issues involved. Other questions which might
have been discussed include the application of
immunity principles to congressional and other6 2
proceedings, comparisons between statutory and
nonstatutory immunity, 63 and whether a potential
"Comment, supra note 6, at 492, citing In re Cardassi,
351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972). The Cardassi case
concluded that when a reasonable fear of foreign prosecu-
tion existed, the rationale of Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), operated to bar compulsory
disclosure. Authorities are reviewed in the trial court opin-
ion in the Weir case discussed in the text accompanying
note 57. In re Weir, 377 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Cal.), affd,
495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038
(1974). See Bauer, supra note 16, at 13.
6 On the special problems of representing congressional
witnesses, see 4 S. BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECH-
NIQUES § 71.11 (1975). Sections 6001-6005 of the 1970
Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970) ("use"
immunity), cover witnesses who appear before Congress
and grand juries as well as those who appear in court.
6 The "use" immunity provision of the 1970 Crime
Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) covers grand jury as
well as other proceedings. On representing a grand jury
witness, especially one who has been granted immunity, see
I R. CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 601, 609
(1975). The grand jury setting has given rise to the issue of
what grand jury requests may be resisted by a witness
under the fifth amendment. Such things as voice or
handwriting exemplars are not protected by the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Hawkins, 501
F.2d 1029 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
As to whether a grand jury witness must be advised of his
privilege against self-incrimination, see United States v.
Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. (1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 989 (1975).
6As when the prosecutor negotiates an agreement to
testify as part of a plea bargain with a guilty-pleading
defendant. See HASTINGS, supra note 8, which suggests that
any abuses in this process, such as the prosecutor making
unauthorized immunity grants, might be ameliorated by
disclosing of plea agreements in open court. Id. at 443.
Under new amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, such reforms have been initiated. FED. R. CR51.
P. 11 (e) (1)-(4) now provides:
(1) In general.-The attorney for the government
and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant
when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a
view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the
entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a
charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the
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grant of immunity should be submitted for judicial
approval."' But the emphasis here has been on the
trial process, i.e., the impact of immunity grants on
witnesses in criminal courts. Detailed discussion of
attorney for the government will do any of the
following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges;
or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree
not to oppose the defendant's request, for a
particular sentence, with the understanding
that such recommendation or request shall
not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the
appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement.-If a plea agreement
has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the
record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open
court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the
time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may
accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there
has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement.-If the court
accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and
sentence the disposition provided for in the plea
agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement.-If the court
rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the
record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the
defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of
good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by
the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportu-
nity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the
defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea
of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be
less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated
by the plea agreement.
For consideration of other settings which give rise to
non-statutory immunity and discussion of the enforceability
against the government of such agreements see the excellent
collection of authorities in Comment, Judicial Supervision
of Non-Statutory Immunity, 65 J. CRI. L. & C. 334
(1974). The article distinguishes between agreements to
testify and plea bargains. It cites, among others, the cases
of United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969)
(agreement enforceable), and People v. Brunner, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973) (substantial
performance on part of accused, bargain held operative).
See also Thornburgh, supra note 16, at 29-35.
4Under the Uniform Rule, the witness must make a
claim of privilege as a precondition of immunity. Most
recent statutes follow this pattern, and it appears to be a
prudent provision, alerting the prosecutor to matters the
witness deems incriminating. See Dixon, Comment on
Immunity Provisions, 2 WORKING PAPERS, NAT'L COMM'N
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1405, 1422
(1970); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 947 (4th ed. 1974) (noting compet-
other settings and different concepts would necessar-
ily dilute this emphasis to some extent. Accordingly,
related problems have been mentioned, but only
briefly, at this time.
Regarding the scope of witness immunity, most
jurisdictions have a provision for granting immunity,
and some of these are under current review. .5 In
ing models); Note, Federal Witness Immunity Act: Ex-
panding the Scope of Pre-Testimony Judicial Review, 5
LOYOLA U.L.J. 470, 475 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Witness Immunity Act]. For the Uniform Rule
provision see note 5 supra. On the rules to be applied
to test whether a witness' claim of self-incrimination is
justified, see State v. Graham, 527 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.
App. 1975) (collecting cases); M. LADD & R. CARL-
SON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 516-18
(1972). See also Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d
1109, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1975) ("witness has no Fifth
Amendment privilege against giving testimony detrimental
to his interests in a civil case unless such testimony tends to
incriminate him"). The Patrick case is discussed in Wolf-
son, supra note 32, at 20.
After the witness claims the privilege, under the Uniform
Rule the prosecuting attorney may make a written request
for an immunity order. This raises the question of whether
immunity grants should be strictly a prosecutorial function,
or whether the trial judge should be given a centralizing
role. Judicial intervention meets the concerns of those who
feel that otherwise immunity may be improvidently con-
ferred. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956),
the question presented was whether the district court had
discretion to review the United States Attorney's determina-
tion that it was "necessary to the public interest" to grant
immunity. The Court held that the statute involved in the
case afforded no discretion to deny an immunity order on
these grounds. The new Uniform Rule carefully includes
language designed to accord the court authority to prevent
abuses. The question is discussed in Federal Witness
Immunity Act, supra. See Thornburgh, supra note 16,
at 11.
A related question deals with the issue of whether a
prosecutor can be compelled to request immunity on behalf
of a witness sought by the defendant. See United States v.
Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (key question is
whether defendant is denied a fair trial by government's
refusal to seek immunity for defense witness) and Thorn-
burgh, supra note 16, at 26.
"See note 3 supra. For recently revised laws see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.04 (West's Supp. 1975-76) (no
person shall be prosecuted on account of any transaction
concerning which he may testify); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 38-1715 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621 C-1
(Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.9 (Supp. 1975-76)
(judge may enter order granting witness "immunity to
prosecution"); N.Y. CRINI. PRO. LAW § 50.20 (McKinney
1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1051 et seq. (1975); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44 (Page 1975); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-45-21 (Supp. 1975). A listing of state laws ap-
pears in MODEL STATE WITNESS IMMUNITY ACT, Com-
ments (1952); 8 WIG.MORE, EVIDENCE § 2281 n.11 (J.
McNaughten rev. ed 1961 and Supp. 1975).
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judging which pattern of immunity serves best,
certain questions must be asked. Which approach,
transactional or "use/derivative use," reduces the
need for extended court hearings? Which pattern
encourages a broad flow of information to the
government? It has been suggested by some authori-
ties that transactional immunity lends itself to ease of
administration, precluding the need for complex
Recent state cases include State v. Denson, 59 Ill. 2d 546,
322 N.E. 2d 464 (1975) (even though trial court, prosecu-
tor, witness and her attorney mistakenly believed immu-
nized testimony could be used to prove prior perjury,
witness was in contempt for failure to obey order to testify
under grant of immunity); State v. Hanson, 342 A.2d 300
(Me. 1975) (limits of perjury prosecution discussed);
Production Credit Ass'n. v. Good, 228 N.W.2d 574, 577
(Minn. 1975) ("witness who in good faith claims the Fifth
Amendment privilege is [not] the sole judge of whether a
question would tend to incriminate him"); State v. Gra-
ham, 527 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App. 1975) ("Only when the
court can say as a matter of law that it is impossible that the
witness would incriminate himself by answering a question,
can the court require an answer"); People v. Gentile, 47
App. Div. 2d 930, 367 N.Y.S.2d. 69 (1975) (although New
York grants full transactonal immunity, it need not insure
full federal transactional immunity to a witness); State v.
Sinito, 43 Ohio St. 2d 98, 330 N.E.2d 896 (1975)
(construed immunity statute to provide both use and
derivative use immunity, so as to be "coextensive in scope
with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion").
pretrial "taint" hearings. Transactional immunity
may also work surprisingly to the benefit of law
enforcement, some suggest, by encouraging people to
testify in hard cases. For several reasons the transac-
tional pattern has been embraced by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and is recommended
by them for adoption in the various states. " The
careful reasoning underlying the Uniform Rule
commends its approach to the attention of the United
States Congress as well. At a time when compre-
hensive immunity provisions are under discussion
there, " serious and open thinking on witness im-
munity should characterize the deliberations. Con-
sideration might well be given to adaptation of the
Uniform Rule as a potential model for federal legisla-
tion.
"'See Pirsig & Kirwin, The N.C.C.U.S.L.'s New
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61 A.B.A.J. 848
(1975). The authors state:
The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, ap-
proved and recommended for adoption in all the states
by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws last August. . . possess not only
the general merit of providing for the states a
comprehensive set of modern and efficient criminal
procedure rules but also the specific merit of making a
huge step in the direction of implementing the
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
justice.
7 See note 2 supra.
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